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RECENT DECISIONS
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT-BENEFICIARY CONTRACT
-RIGHT OF UNION MEMBER TO SUE.-The defendant entered into
an agreement with a union representing his employees. The contract
was to run for two years and the defendant was to employ only union
men. Among the provisions as to wages and hours there was one
which recited that no employee shall be discharged except for cause
or for economic reasons, in which case dismissals shall be according
to seniority. The plaintiff was dismissed before the contract was
terminated and he brings this action for damages for breach of con-
tract, basing his claim either on the theory that the union was his
agent in contracting or on the theory that by employing the plaintiff
the defendant adopted the union's contract as the plaintiff's. The de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by the Supreme
Court dismissing the complaint and upon appeal to the Appellate
Division, held, judgment affirmed. The union, in contracting with
employers, established rights in itself as a legal entity and not as
agents of its members. Adoption as set forth by the plaintiff would
run counter to the Statute of Frauds.' Rotnofsky v. Capitol Dis-
tributors Corp., 262 App. Div. 521, 30 N. Y. S. (24) 563 (1941).
Employees of employers who have signed collective bargaining
agreements with unions have been able to recover for breach of such
upon one of three theories generally; the usage, the agency, or the
beneficiary theory. Those who hold to the usage theory, also known
as the adoption theory, view the collective bargaining agreement not
as a contract binding on the employer in his future dealings with em-
ployees but as a general offer of what he is willing to be bound by
when he employs. The specific acceptance of employment by the
individual converts the offer into a contract, 2 separate and distinct
as to each employee.3 The union in such case eliminates the neces-
sity of separate bargaining by each employee. Such usage of the
union agreement may become part of the individual employee's con-
tract by express adoption or by the absence of a provision to the
contrary.4 When the employee seeks to enforce his rights he does so
on his parol agreement and not on the union's.5 The disadvantage
IN. Y. PEms. PRop. LAw § 31. Every agreement, promise or undertaking
is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and
subscribed by the party to be charged or his lawful agent if such agreement,
promise or undertaking:
(1) By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof * * *
2 1 WlIMSTON, LAW OF CoNTRAcTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 379A.
s Yazoo, etc. R. R. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933);
Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 122 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934).
4 Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 Ark. 197, 224 S. W. 436 (1920);
Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (1928);
see (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221.
5 Illinois Central R. R. v. Moore, 112 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
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of this type of interpretation is that the employee may contract con-
trary to the provisions of the union agreement. This theory is not
followed in this state for cases have held that a member may recover
the difference between what he agreed to receive and the union con-
tract rate even though he knew what the rate was when he contracted
since the employer was already obligated to hire at a set rate and
he could not contract below this.6 Even if the usage theory was fol-
lowed in New York the plaintiff would be unable to recover on a con-
tract for two years which was not in writing and signed by the party
to be charged,7 if this statute is pleaded. The attempt to enforce the
agreement on the theory of agency was likewise frustrated by the
refusal of the courts to apply such.
New York has allowed union members to recover on the basis
of third party beneficiary 8 since many, if not most, of the provisions
of union contracts are for the benefit of the members. In the instant
case the plaintiff did not seek to recover as a beneficiary but the court
said in dicta that he could not recover even as such. The court held
the two years' period to be the duration of the contract under which
the union was to have certain rights and was not the period of time
during which the employee was to work. The possible error of the
court may be seen by examining the effect of the provisions of the
contract in the instant case. Conditions precedent to the discharge
of the employee limit the freedom with which the employer can deal
with such individual. Where he is further limited by a closed shop
agreement, which has been held valid and enforceable, 9 he has no
choice but to keep the employee until the conditions precedent occur
or until the term of the contract comes to an end. Where one is dis-
charged wrongfully under such an agreement he should be able to
recover damages.' 0 Seniority provisions, as in the instant case, are
essentially for the benefit of the employees and, though at first re-
luctant, courts have to some extent come to look upon the seniority
rights as a property right." When an employer discharges an em-
ployee the damage is to the latter and not to the union; therefore
recovery by the union for the breach of a provision forbidding this
can be only nominal for the technical invasion of the union's rights.' 2
The union has been permitted to recover a substantial sum only in
6 Reichert v. Quindazzi, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 284 (Mun. Ct. 1938).
7 See note 1, supra.8 Gulickson v. Seglin Const. Co., 152 Misc. 624, 273 N. Y. Supp. 908(1934); Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't
1914) ; H. Blum & Co. v. Londau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926).
9 Kissam v. U. S. Printing Co., 199 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910) ; Gulla
v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914) ; Murphy v.
Higgens, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
'ojohnson v. American Express Co., 163 S. C. 188, 161 S. E. 473 (1931).
"McCoy v. St. Joseph's Belt Ry., 77 S. W. 175 (Mo. 1934); Rice, Jr.,
Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HAnv. L. REv. 572.
12 Berney v. Adriana, 157 App. Div. 628, 142 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1st Dep't
1913).
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behalf of the employee, as trustee of the beneficiary, where there was
a breach of the union contract.18 An employee under contract, if
discharged before termination without cause, may recover damages
up to the date of termination.1 4  Obviously, where the union contract
is for two years and discharge is dependent on conditions precedent,
the employees must be kept for two years if these conditions are not
present and ought to recover damages if discharged before. Dam-
ages were recovered when an employer discharged an employee be-
fore presenting the case to the Arbitration Board as agreed upon
with the union, although there was no definite period for the duration
of the contract.' 5 Likewise, where two weeks' notice was required
before discharge and it was not given, recovery was had for this
period.' 6 As the dissenting opinion stated, the recitals were plainly
for the benefit of the employees, and the plaintiff should have based
his action on this theory. The plaintiff should have amended his
complaint, asking recovery as a beneficiary, and he would have un-
doubtedly been allowed to go to trial to determine whether the con-
ditions for dismissal were present.
L.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BANKRUPTCY-VEHICLE AND TIAFFIC
LAW-REVOCATION OF LICENSE.--This is a suit to restrain appellee
(defendant) from enforcing a suspension of the appellant's operator's
license. The complaint alleges that the order suspending the license
was issued May 29, 1940, pursuant to Section 94-b of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law of New York,' upon receipt by the appellee from
Is Barth v. Addie Co., 271 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. (2d) 34 (1936).
14Denniston v. Finnegan, 174 App. Div. 8, 160 N. Y. Supp. 5 (4th Dep't
1916) ; Cottone v. Murray's, 138 App. Div. 874, 123 N. Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dep't
1910).
15 Moore v. Illinois Central Ry., 180 Miss. 276, 176 So. 593 (1937).
16 See note 14, supra.
1 This section, when originally added to the article (L. 1929, c. 695), and
despite subsequent amendments (L. 1930, c. 398; L. 1931, c. 669; L. 1934,
c. 438), provided, in part, for the suspension of the operator's license and
registration certificate of any person against whom a judgment was obtained
because of injury to person or property sustained through the operation of a
motor vehicle if said judgment was not satisfied within fifteen days after
certification of the judgment, its finality and non-payment, to the commissioner
of motor vehicles by the county clerk. It directed the commissioner to suspend
the license for three years, unless the judgment be satisfied or discharged in
the meantime, except by a discharge it bankruptcy. (Italics mine.) On May
4, 1936 the section was amended (L. 1936, cc. 293, 448, 771) and a proviso
added that upon the cieditor's written consent, the debtor might be allowed a
license and registration for six months from date of such consent, and there-
after until the consent was revoked in writing, if debtor gave proof of his
financial ability to respond in damages. On May 31, 1939 (L. 1939, c. 618) a
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